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1 Introduction
When there are many ﬁrms and consumers, the market is consid-
ered to be perfectly competitive. Competitive equilibrium is char-
acterized by proﬁt maximization of price taking ﬁrms, utility maxi-
mization of price taking consumers, and market clearing (for a for-
mal presentation, see, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
(1995:pp.314-315)). The ﬁrst fundamental theorem of welfare eco-
nomics states that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient.
On the other hand, when there is only one or are only a few ﬁrms,
the market is considered imperfectly competitive. It has been shown
that imperfect competition, such as monopoly or Cournot oligopoly,
creates welfare loss due to market power possessed by ﬁrms. This
ineﬃciency result is typically labeled as an example of market failure,
and contrasted to the eﬃciency result of competitive equilibrium.
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However, such a comparison of the results between competitive
equilibrium and imperfectly competitive (monopoly/oligopoly) equi-
librium may not be readily used to evaluate the functioning of mar-
kets. This is because transaction rules considered in monopoly/oligopoly
equilibrium are diﬀerent from transaction rules considered in com-
petitive equilibrium. For example, in Cournot oligopoly, each ﬁrm
announces its quantity, and it sells the announced quantity at the
price where the aggregate quantity is equal to the downward-sloping
market demand. This is the transaction rule under Cournot compe-
tition. However, such a simple quantity setting rule does not seem
to be the rule of transaction in competitive equilibrium. In fact, no
explicit transaction rule is speciﬁed in competitive equilibrium. That
is, in competitive equilibrium, somehow each ﬁrm and each consumer
calculates its proﬁt maximizing supply and her utility maximizing de-
mand taking the equilibrium price as given, somehow the equilibrium
price is determined so that aggregate supply is equal to aggregate
demand, and somehow the ﬁrms and consumers make trade at the
equilibrium price. Under what kind of rule trades between ﬁrms and
consumers take place in competitive equilibrium is thus just a matter
of interpretation.
At least there are two kinds of standard interpretation for trans-
action rules of competitive equilibrium. One interpretation is to take
the deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium literally: ﬁrms and con-
2
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sumers are supposed to submit their individual supply functions and
demand functions to the auctioneer, and then the auctioneer adds
up individual supply functions and individual demand functions re-
spectively to calculate the market supply and the market demand
functions. Then, the auctioneer ﬁnds the market clearing price that
equates the market demand and market supply, and the auctioneer
lets the ﬁrms and the consumers to sell and buy the quantities on
their supply and demand functions at the market clearing price. We
call this transaction rule supply function competition.1 The other in-
terpretation is the one suggested by Walras: ﬁrst, the auctioneer an-
nounces a price, and ﬁrms and consumers respond by submitting the
quantities they want to make sales and purchases. Then, if the aggre-
gate quantity all ﬁrms want to sell is equal to the aggregate quantity
all consumers want to buy, the auctioneer allows the ﬁrms and the
consumers to make trade the amount of their submitted quantities
at the announced price. Otherwise, a new price is searched accord-
ing to a prespeciﬁed price adjustment rule, and the price adjustment
continues until the price that equates aggregate quantity to sell and
the aggregate quantity to buy is found. This is called Walrasian
taˆtonnement.
As we insisted above, simply mentioning ineﬃciency results of
1More accurately, we should call this supply function and demand function
competition. However, since we focus on behavior of ﬁrms in this research, we
call it by a shorter name of supply function competition.
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Cournot oligopoly is not necessarily a right evaluation of the function-
ing of markets because the transaction rule under Cournot oligopoly
is diﬀerent from the rules in competitive equilibrium. So, an objective
of this research is to more carefully assess the functioning of markets.
For this objective, we are going to examine oligopoly equilibrium
under the transaction rules of competitive equilibrium we just men-
tioned above. That is, we investigate behavior of oligopoly ﬁrms un-
der supply function competition,2 and under Walrasian taˆtonnement.3
By doing so, we would like to see how well or how poorly the market
works when there are only a few ﬁrms. Or, more precisely speaking,
our objective is to see how well or how poorly the transaction rules
that could make the equilibrium outcome Pareto eﬃcient if ﬁrms and
consumers behave as price takers work when ﬁrms have market power.
In addition, by comparing the equilibrium outcomes under supply
function competition and under Walrasian taˆtonnement, we will be
able to see if these two transaction rules, which give identical results
when ﬁrms and consumers are price takers, still give identical results
even when ﬁrms have market power. This is another objective of the
2There are several researches on oligopoly under supply function competition.
See Grossman (1981), Hart (1985), Klemperer and Meyer (1989). Also, it is known
that oligopoly under supply function competition has a very similar structure as
uniform-price auction. See LiCalzi and Pavan (2005).
3Bronfman et. al (1996) presents an experimental research on Walrasian
taˆtonnement. The similarity between Walrasian taˆtonnement and dynamic auc-
tions is seen in Ausubel and Schwartz (1999), Ausubel (2004), and Ausubel and
Cramton (2006).
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research. In this note, we report what we have found so far.
2 Model
In this note, we work on a partial-equilibrium model. For the demand
side, we use a conventional assumption: there are many small price
taking consumers. The market demand curve, denoted by D (p), is
assumed linear: D (p) = ab −
1
bp.
On the other hand, for the supply side, there are not many but
only two ﬁrms, called ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2. They have an identical pro-
duction technology: we assume that the marginal cost of production
is constant and zero. Given the linear demand and the symmetric
ﬁrms, if these two ﬁrms play a Cournot game of quantity competi-
tion, the equilibrium is that each ﬁrm sells a/3b, and the equilibrium
price is a/3. If these two ﬁrms could collude and behave as a monop-
olist, they would choose a quantity-price pair of a/2b and a/2.
3 Supply function competition
First, we consider a transaction rule we call supply function compe-
tition. Under this rule, each ﬁrm simultaneously submits its supply
function si (p), i = 1, 2. These supply functions are added up to
the market supply function S (p) = s1 (p) + s2 (p). The intersection
of this market supply and the market demand determines a market
5
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clearing price p∗. Here, for simplicity, we assume that transaction
occurs only when p∗ is unique. if no p∗ exists or p∗ is not unique,
then no transaction is allowed.
Formally, supply function competition is a game played by ﬁrm
1 and ﬁrm 2. The strategy si : R+ → R+ of ﬁrm i (i = 1, 2) is
any function of prices to quantities supplied, and strategy space Si
is the set of all such functions si (p). The set of market clearing
prices is P ∗ = {p|D (p) = S (p)}. Under supply function competition,
transaction occurs only when P ∗ is singleton (and use p∗ to denote
the market clearing price, which is the unique element of P ∗). The
payoﬀ to ﬁrm i is πi (s1, s2) = p∗si (p∗) if transaction occurs, and
πi (s1, s2) = 0 if it does not occur. A pair of supply functions (s1, s2)
constitutes a Nash equilibrium of this game if π1 (s1, s2) ≥ π1 (s1, s2)
for any s1 and π2 (s1, s2) ≥ π2 (s1, s

2) for any s

2.
In this game, it is easy to show that the Cournot outcome is
supported as an equilibrium: simply, set s1 (p) = s2 (p) = a3b . Given
that ﬁrm 1 is doing this, the residual demand for ﬁrm 2, denoted by
r2 (p), is r2 (p) = D (p) − a3b =
2a
3b −
1
bp. The proﬁt of ﬁrm 2, as a
function of p, is then pr2 (p). Since this is maximized at p = a3 , in
order to make this price clear the market, ﬁrm 2 should choose s2
�
a
3

= a3b . For the other prices, by setting s2 (p) =
a
3b ﬁrm 2 can guarantee
that p = a3 is the unique market clearing price. Therefore,
�
a
3b ,
a
3b

is
a Nash equilibrium.
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However, this is not the unique equilibrium of supply function
competition. There are plenty of other equilibria in this game. In fact,
any prices 0 < p < a can be supported as an equilibrium outcome
of supply function competition. For example, ﬁx some p˜, 0 < p˜ < a.
Let
s (p) =



1
2D (p) for p = p˜
a
b for 0 ≤ p < p˜ and p˜ < p
.
When ﬁrm 1 is playing this s (p), for ﬁrm 2 there is only one price, p˜,
at which ﬁrm 2’s residual demand is positive, and thus ﬁrm 2 picks
up this residual demand by choosing s (p˜) at p˜. Therefore, a pair
(s (p) , s (p)) constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium supporting p˜.
From this discussion, we can immediately see that the monopoly price
a
2 is supported as an equilibrium outcome. In other words, supply
function competition, which could make the market outcome eﬃcient
when ﬁrms were price takers, may result in supporting full collusion.
Namely, the market can go to the worst.
However, the supply functions used above to support full collu-
sion are in very odd form: they are neither continuous nor increasing.
What happens if supply functions are restricted to be continuous, or
nondecreasing? Below, we show that if supply functions are restricted
to be continuous and nondecreasing, equilibria are at most as uncom-
petitive as Cournot.
7
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Proposition 1 If supply functions are restricted to be nondecreas-
ing and continuous, any prices above the Cournot level cannot be
supported as an equilibrium outcome.
Proof. Consider a pair of quantities (qˆ1, qˆ2) and a price pˆ = D−1 (qˆ1 + qˆ2) =
a − b (qˆ1 + qˆ2). Choose a pair of supply functions si (p) that pass
through (pˆ, qˆi), and examine whether this supply function can sup-
port pˆ as an equilibrium outcome.
Given sj (p), ﬁrm i’s residual demand is ri (p) = D (p) − sj (p).
For any p, if ﬁrm i picks up this residual demand, it can make that
p the market clearing price. So, the problem of ﬁrm i is to ﬁnd at
which p it is going to pick up the residual demand. In other words,
ﬁrm i’s problem is to ﬁnd a proﬁt maximizing price along its resid-
ual demand curve: maxp πi (p) = pri (p). The ﬁrst order condition is
p

D (p)− sj (p)

+D (p)−sj (p) = 0. If pˆ is going to solve this prob-
lem, then it must hold that D (pˆ)+ qˆipˆ = s

j (pˆ). With the restrictions
of nondecreasing and continuous supply functions (sj (p) ≥ 0), the
prices that are supported in equilibrium must satisfy D (pˆ)+ qˆipˆ ≥ 0.
Using D (p) = ab −
1
bp, we have D
 (pˆ) + qˆipˆ ≥ 0 ⇔ pˆ ≤ bqˆi. Since this
is true for i = 1, 2, it holds that 2pˆ ≤ b (qˆ1 + qˆ2), which is equivalent
to pˆ ≤ a3 .
For this result, one may ask: which of the restrictions, continuity
or nondecreasingness, or both, is working? The following examples
8
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answer this question: they show that continuity of supply functions
is not suﬃcient for having the result of Proposition 1.
Example 1 Let
s (p) =



a
4b for
a
2 ≤ p
−1b
�
p− a2

+ a4b for 0 ≤ p <
a
2
.
Note that this s (p) is continuous. We show that a symmetric pair
(s (p) , s (p)) is a Nash equilibrium. First, consider a2 ≤ p. Given that
ﬁrm j is playing s (p), the residual demand for ﬁrm i is r (p) = 3a4b−
1
bp,
and its proﬁt is pr (p) = p
�
3a
4b −
1
bp

. The ﬁrst derivative of the proﬁt
is 3a4b −
2
bp. At p =
a
2 , this is equal to
3a
4b −
a
b < 0. Since the second
derivative of the proﬁt is −2b < 0, for
a
2 ≤ p the proﬁt is the largest
at p = a2 . Next, consider 0 ≤ p <
a
2 . Given sj (p) = s (p), the
residual demand for ﬁrm i is r (p) = a2b −
1
2bp. Its proﬁt is thus
pr (p) = p
�
a
2b −
1
2bp

. The ﬁrst derivative of the proﬁt is a2b −
1
bp,
and evaluated at p = a2 , this is equal to
a
2b −
a
2b = 0. Since the second
derivative is −1b < 0, for 0 ≤ p <
a
2 the proﬁt is less than the proﬁt
at p = a2 . Therefore, s (p) is a best response to s (p). Full collusion
(p = a/2) is supported by the equilibrium (s (p) , s (p)).
In Example 1, the aggregate supply curve is not crossing the de-
mand curve but just touching it, and S (p) ≥ D (p) for any p. This is
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still somewhat unusual. One may wonder whether the full collusion
holds even if we impose an additional condition that the aggregate
supply curve should cross the demand curve, on top of the conti-
nuity assumption. To see this, we put the “crossing” condition for-
mally: trade takes place at p∗ only if p∗ = sup{p|D (p) ≥ S (p)} =
inf{p|D (p) ≤ S (p)}. Even with this crossing condition, however, the
continuity restriction on supply curves allows the ﬁrms almost fully
collude. See Example 2.
Example 2 Let
s (p) =



a
4b +
1
2bε for
a
2 − ε ≤ p
−
�
1
2b − η
 �
p− a2 + ε

+ a4b +
1
2bε for 0 ≤ p <
a
2 − ε
,
where ε > 0 and η > 0 are arbitrary small number. Notice this s (p)
is continuous. First, consider a2−ε ≤ p. Given that ﬁrm j plays s (p),
the residual demand for ﬁrm i is r (p) = 3a4b−
1
bp−
1
2bε, and the proﬁt is
pr (p) = p
�
3a
4b −
1
bp−
1
2bε

. The ﬁrst derivative of the proﬁt function
is 3a4b −
2
bp−
1
2bε. At p =
a
2 − ε, this is equal to −
a
4b +
3
2bε. Thus, as
long as − a4b +
3
2bε < 0 ⇔ ε <
a
6 , the proﬁt is the largest at p =
a
2 − ε.
Next, consider 0 ≤ p < a2 − ε. Given sj (p) = s (p), the residual
demand for ﬁrm i is r (p) = a2b−
�
1
2b + η

p+η
�
a
2 − ε

, and the proﬁt
is pr (p) = p
�
a
2b −
�
1
2b + η

p+ η
�
a
2 − ε

. The ﬁrst derivative of the
proﬁt is a2b −
�
1
b + 2η

p + η
�
a
2 − ε

. At p = a2 − ε, this is equal to
10
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1
bε+ηε−
a
2η. If η is chosen such that η =
1
abε, then the ﬁrst derivative
of the proﬁt evaluated at p = a2 − ε is
1
2bε+
1
abε
2 > 0. Therefore, for
0 ≤ p < a2 − ε, the proﬁt is less than the proﬁt at p =
a
2 − ε, provided
that the second derivative of the proﬁt is −
�
1
b + 2η

< 0. Therefore,
s (p) is a best response to s (p). With this s (p), the crossing condition
is satisﬁed and p∗ = a2 − ε. By choosing ε arbitrary small, the ﬁrms
can achieve almost full collusion.
Now, in the proposition below, we show that continuity is not
necessary either: as long as supply curves are nondecreasing, the
equilibrium price is never higher than the Cournot price in supply
function competition.
Proposition 2 If supply functions are restricted to be nondecreasing,
p > a3 is never supported as an equilibrium outcome.
Proof. Consider some p˜ > a3 . For p˜ to be supported in equilibrium,
it must be that s1 (p˜) + s2 (p˜) = D (p˜). Without loss of generality,
let s1 (p˜) = kD (p˜) and s2 (p˜) = (1− k)D (p˜), where 12 ≤ k ≤ 1. To
see if p˜ can be supported, consider the deviation of ﬁrm 2. With
a restriction of nondecreasing supply functions, for p ≤ p˜, the best
thing ﬁrm 1 can do to minimize the deviation gain of ﬁrm 2 is to set
s1 (p) = kD (p˜). Given this supply function of ﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 2’s residual
demand is D (p) − kD (p˜), and its proﬁt is p (D (p)− kD (p˜)). The
11
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derivative of ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt is ab −
2
bp − k
�
a
b −
1
b p˜

. Evaluated at
p = p˜, this derivative is negative. Therefore, given ﬁrm 1’s strategy
of s1 (p) = kD (p˜) for p ≤ p˜, ﬁrm 2 can have higher proﬁt at some
p < p˜ than at p˜. Thus p˜ cannot be supported as an equilibrium
outcome.
So, continuity of supply functions is neither suﬃcient nor neces-
sary to have the result that equilibria in supply function competition
are at most as uncompetitive as Cournot.
Before concluding this section, let us conﬁrm that for any p ≤ a3
we can construct an example where nondecreasing supply functions
give p as an equilibrium price.
Example 3 Fix some p˜ ≤ a3 . Let
s (p) =



a
b for p˜ < p
D(p˜)
2 for 0 ≤ p ≤ p˜
Given that ﬁrm i plays s (p), the market is never cleared no matter
what ﬁrm j does for p˜ ≤ p. For 0 ≤ p ≤ p˜, the residual demand of
ﬁrm j facing si (p) = s (p) is r (p) = a2b −
1
bp +
1
2b p˜, and the proﬁt
is pr (p) = p
�
a
2b −
1
bp+
1
2b p˜

. The ﬁrst derivative of the proﬁt is
a
2b −
2
bp +
1
2b p˜. Evaluated at p = p˜, this is equal to
1
2b (a− 3p˜) ≥ 0
because p˜ ≤ a3 . Provided that the proﬁt function is concave in p, it is
maximized at p˜. Thus, (s (p) , s (p)) is a Nash equilibrium.
12
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4 Walrasian Taˆtonnement
Now let us turn toWalrasian taˆtonnement. Under Walrasian taˆtonnement,
the game played by the ﬁrms goes as follows. First, the auctioneer
announces an initial price p0 (the price at period 0). Then, two ﬁrms
simultaneously submit quantity supplied, s0i (i = 1, 2). In this nota-
tion, the subscript stands for a ﬁrm and the superscript for a time
period. Let S0 = s01 + s
0
2. If S
0 = D
�
p0

, the market is cleared and
transaction takes place: ﬁrm i sells s0i units of the good at the price of
p0 and receives the proﬁt p0s0i . In this case, the game ends at period
0. If S0 = D
�
p0

, the game continues and moves to period 1. The
price in period t is determined by a price adjustment process of
pt = pt−1 + λ
�
D
�
pt−1

− St−1

, (1)
where St−1 = st−11 + s
t−1
2 and λ > 0. In equation (1), we need to
impose some upper bound on λ so as not for the time path of pt
to be divergent. Here, we simply assume that λ < b. At period t,
transaction takes place if the market is cleared at pt: i.e., St = D
�
pt

.
Then, the game ends at period t. If the market is not cleared, the
game continues and moves to period t+1. We assume that the game
ends anyway at some prespeciﬁed period T . If the game is reached
to period T and ST = D
�
pT

, no transaction takes place, and each
ﬁrm gets zero proﬁt.
13
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Formally, the game played under Walrasian taˆtonnement is stated
as follows. Players are ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2. Firm i (i = 1, 2) submits
sti at period t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T}, where s
t
i ∈ Xi and Xi is some subset
of R+. Let ht =

st

1 , s
t
2

0≤t≤t−1
denote the history of play from
period 0 to period t − 1, and Ht is the set of all possible histories.
A strategy of ﬁrm i, σi : {0, 1, ..., T} × Ht → Xi is any function of
periods and histories to quantities supplied. The strategy space Σi
is the set of all such functions σi
�
t, ht

. To simplify notation we
write a realization of σi
�
t, ht

as sti. The game ends at period t if
St = D
�
pt

or if t = T . The time path of the price is given by an
initial price p0 and the adjustment process (1). The payoﬀ to ﬁrm i at
period t (if period t is reached) is πi

sti, s
t
j

= ptsti (where i = 1, 2,
and i = j) when St = D
�
pt

, and πi

sti, s
t
j

= 0 otherwise. The
present value of the payoﬀ stream of ﬁrm i is δtptsti (where δ ∈ [0, 1)
is a discount factor) when St = D
�
pt

at some period t, or equal to
zero if ST = D
�
pT

. Because the game is dynamic, the equilibrium
concept we use is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
In the game under supply function competition, we restricted sup-
ply functions to be nondecreasing. Here, in the game under Walrasian
taˆtonnement, the restriction of nondecreasing supply function takes
the following form: if pt < pt

, then sti ≤ s
t
i , and if p
t = pt

, then
sti = s
t
i . With this restriction, we show the following proposition
about what does not happen in equilibrium.
14
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Proposition 3 Assume that δ is very close to 1. When p0 > a3 , p
0
is never supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome under
Walrasian Taˆtonnement.
Proof. Let
�
s0∗1 , s
0∗
2

=
�
kD
�
p0

, (1− k)D
�
p0

, and see if this pair
can be sustained as an SPNE outcome. Without loss of generality,
we can assume 12 ≤ k ≤ 1. We prove this proposition by examining
if ﬁrm 2 can gain by deviating alone from s0∗2 in period 0.
Let ﬁrm 2 choose s02 = (1− k)D
�
p0

+ e, where e > 0. By this
deviation, period-1 price is lower than p0 since p1 = p0 − λe. With
a lowered price of p1, due to the nondecreasing constraint, what ﬁrm
1 and 2 submitted in period 0 become upper bound for s11 and s
2
1
respectively: that is, s11 ≤ kD
�
p0

and s12 ≤ (1− k)D
�
p0

+e. Thus,
choosing a large e in period 0 is beneﬁcial to ﬁrm 2 in the sense that
it can widen the range of s12. At the same time, however, choosing a
large e is harmful in the sense that it lowers p1 and thus lowers ﬁrm
2’s potential period-1 proﬁt. Noting this, let us consider the following
inequalities.
D
�
p1

≤ (1− k)D
�
p0

+ e ⇔
k
�
a− p0

b− λ
≤ e (2a)
D
�
p0

< (1− k)D
�
p0

+ e ⇔
k
�
a− p0

b
< e (2b)
p1
�
D
�
p1

− kD
�
p0

> p0 (1− k)D
�
p0

⇔
p0 − (1− k)
�
a− p0

λ
> e
(2c)
15
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The ﬁrst inequality (2a) tells how large e ﬁrm 2 should choose in order
to be able to clear the market even when ﬁrm 1 sets s11 = 0 (that is,
in order to clear the market alone) in period 1 at p1. The second
inequality (2b) is somewhat similar to the ﬁrst one but gives a less
stringent condition for e: it tells how large e ﬁrm 2 should choose in
order to be able to clear the market alone for some p < p0. The third
inequality (2c), on the other hand, gives an upper bound on e: it
tells how small e ﬁrm 2 should choose in order to make its minimum
period-1 proﬁt (i.e., the proﬁt of ﬁrm 2 in period 1 when s11 is at its
upper bound) larger than its period-0 proﬁt with no deviation. Now,
deﬁne p as follows:
p
�
D
�
p

− kD
�
p0

= p0 (1− k)D
�
p0

, and p < p0.
It is easy to calculate that p = (1− k)
�
a− p0

. If p1 ≤ p, the
inequality (2c) is not satisﬁed. Then, using p, we can rewrite the
condition (2c) as
p0 − p
λ
> e.
Now, let us work on the inequalities (2). Combining inequalities
(2a) and (2c), we have
k
�
a− p0

b− λ
≤ e <
p0 − p
λ
. (3)
16
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For this range of e to exist, it has to hold that
k
�
a− p0

b− λ
<
p0 − p
λ
⇔ λ < b
p0 − p
p0 − p+ k (a− p0)
. (4)
Next, combine inequalities (2b) and (2c) to have
k
�
a− p0

b
< e <
p0 − p
λ
. (5)
For this range of e to exist, it has to hold that
k
�
a− p0

b
<
p0 − p
λ
⇔ λ < b
p0 − p
k (a− p0)
. (6)
By using inequalities (4), (6), and λ < b, we can partition the
whole range of λ, 0 ≤ λ < b, into the following three regions: Region
1 is given by
λ < b
p0 − p
p0 − p+ k (a− p0)
; (7)
Region 2 is
b
p0 − p
p0 − p+ k (a− p0)
≤ λ < b
p0 − p
k (a− p0)
; (8)
and Region 3 is4
b
p0 − p
k (a− p0)
≤ λ < b. (9)
4In the LHS of inequality (9), the numerator of the fraction p0 − p is less than
or equal to the denominator k (a− p0) if and only if p0 ≤ a/2. Thus, when we
consider p0 > a/2, we do not have to worry about region 3.
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We prove this proposition by examining these three regions sep-
arately. First, look at Region 1. If inequality (7) is satisﬁed, there
exist some e satisfying (3). In this case, if ﬁrm 2 chooses such e
to deviate, in the next period (period 1), no matter what s11 ﬁrm 1
chooses, ﬁrm 2 can choose right s12 to clear the market and receive a
proﬁt larger than the proﬁt without deviation. Therefore,
�
s0∗1 , s
0∗
2

cannot be supported as an SPNE if λ is in Region 1.
Second, look at Region 2. When λ is in this region (satisfying
inequality (8)), there is no e satisfying (3). This means that, for any
e that make resulting p1 above p, there exist some s11 for which no
matter what s12 ﬁrm 2 chooses, the market cannot be cleared at p
1 due
to the restriction of s12 ≤ (1− k)D
�
p0

+ e. However, when λ is in
Region 2, there are some e satisfying (5). This means that for some e
that make resulting p1 above p, there exist some p˜ ∈
�
p1, p0

such that
if the announced price is above p˜, no matter what st1 ≤ kD
�
p0

ﬁrm
1 chooses, ﬁrm 2 can choose appropriate st2 to clear the market. Now,
let ﬁrm 2 to choose s02 = D
�
p0

+v (i.e., e = kD
�
p0

+v), where v is
an arbitrary small number satisfying kD
�
p0

< kD
�
p0

+ v <
p0−p
λ .
By this choice of s02, it holds that p
1 > p. Then, deﬁne pA = p0 − bv.
Namely, D
�
pA

= D
�
p0

+ v, and thus at pA ﬁrm 2 is able to clear
the market no matter what ﬁrm 1 does.
Here, what we will show is that after this deviation, ﬁrm 2 can
choose s12 appropriately so as to make either p
2 equal to pA, or the
18
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market cleared in period 1. Note that the market demand in period
1 is D
�
p1

= D(pA) + p
A−p1
b . By the choice of s
0
2 speciﬁed above,
p1 ∈
�
p, pA

. For any given s11, if ﬁrm 2 can choose s˜
1
2 such that
s˜12 = D
�
p1

− s11 −
pA − p1
λ
,
then the excess demand in period 1 is equal to p
A−p1
λ so that p
2 = pA.
We conﬁrm that s˜12 is feasible: i.e., 0 ≤ s˜
1
2 ≤ s
0
2 = D
�
pA

. First,
conﬁrm s˜12 ≤ D
�
pA

.
D
�
pA

− s˜12 = D
�
pA

−D
�
p1

+ s11 +
pA − p1
λ
= −
pA − p1
b
+ s11 +
pA − p1
λ
=

b− λ
bλ
�
pA − p1

+ s11 > 0.
Next, check 0 ≤ s˜12. Using p0 − p1 = λe, we have
s˜12 = D
�
p1

−
p0 − p1
λ
+
p0 − pA
λ
− s11
= D
�
p1

− e+
p0 − pA
λ
− s11
= (1− k)D
�
p0

+
p0 − pA
λ
+

pA − p1
b
− s11

.
The ﬁrst two terms are positive. If the last term is nonnegative, then
s˜12 ≥ 0 is satisﬁed. If the last term is negative, i.e.,
pA−p1
b < s
1
1, then,
for such s11, ﬁrm 2 can choose some s
1
2 ≤ D
�
pA

to clear the market
19
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in period 1, and receive a higher proﬁt than p0s0∗2 . Therefore, for any
s11, ﬁrm 2 can choose s
1
2 appropriately so as to make either p
2 equal
to pA, or the market cleared in period 1.
If period 2 is reached, then p2 = pA. At this price, by deﬁnition,
for any given s21 ﬁrm 2 can clear the market and get a proﬁt larger
than p0s0∗2 . Hence, when λ is in Region 2, ﬁrm 2 can gain by deviating
from s0∗2 .
Finally, consider Region 3. When λ is in this region, no e satisﬁes
(5). This means that, if ﬁrm 2 chooses e large enough to make itself
able to clear the market at some p < p0, then the resulting price in
period 1 falls below p.
As we did for Region 2, let ﬁrm 2 choose s02 = D
�
p0

+ v, and
investigate what follows. Since λ is in Region 3, p1 < p. Now,
consider whether ﬁrm 2 can make p2 = pA: that is, whether the
following sˆ12,
sˆ12 = D
�
p1

− s11 −
pA − p1
λ
,
is feasible. First, check sˆ12 ≤ D
�
pA

:
D
�
pA

− sˆ12 = D
�
p0

+ v −

D
�
p0

+
λ
b
e

+ s11 +
p0 − bv − p0 + λe
λ
=

b− λ
b

kD
�
p0

+ s11 +

1−
λ
b
−
b− λ
λ

v > 0,
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since v > 0 can be arbitrary small. Then, examine if sˆ12 ≥ 0:
sˆ12 = D
�
p1

− s11 −
pA − p1
λ
= D
�
p0

+
λ
b
e− s11 −
p0 − bv − p0 + λe
λ
=

1−

2−
λ
b

k

D
�
p0

+
�
kD
�
p0

− s11

+

λ
b
+
b− λ
λ

v.
(10)
If (10) is nonnegative, then ﬁrm 2 can make p2 = pA. In such a case,
ﬁrm 2 can get a proﬁt higher than p0s0∗2 by deviating from s
0∗
2 . For
example, if 1 −
�
2− λb

k ≥ 0, or, equivalently, if b2b−λ ≥ k, then
sˆ12 ≥ 0.
What is left to show is the case where ﬁrm 2 cannot make p2 = pA.
That is, the case where sˆ12 < 0. In this case, we consider the following
two steps: starting from p1 < p in period 1, ﬁrm 2 makes p2 > p as
the ﬁrst step. Then, in the second step, ﬁrm 2 makes p3 = pA.
Consider step 1. Notice that if the excess demand is larger than
p−p1
λ , then p2 > p. This condition is translated into the upper bound
for s12: namely, s
1
2 should be small enough to satisfy
s12 < D
�
p1

− s11 −
p− p1
λ
. (11)
So, for such s12 to exist, the RHS of the inequality (11) has to be
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positive:
D
�
p1

− s11 −
p− p1
λ
= D
�
p0

+
λ
b
e− kD
�
p0

+
�
kD
�
p0

− s11

−
p− p0 + λe
λ
=

1−

2−
λ
b

k

D
�
p0

+
p0 − p
λ
+
�
kD
�
p0

− s11

−

1−
λ
b

v
(12)
Taking the derivative of the ﬁrst two terms of (12) with respect to k,
we have
−

2−
λ
b

a− p0
b
+
a− p0
λ
=
(b− λ)2
�
a− p0

λb2
> 0,
namely, the ﬁrst two terms of (12) are increasing in k. Then, evaluate
the ﬁrst two terms of (12) at k = 1/2 to ﬁnd
λ
2b
a− p0
b
+
p0 − 12
�
a− p0

λ
> 0.
This is because the ﬁrst term is positive and the second term is pos-
itive since p0 > a/3. Therefore, for any k such that 12 ≤ k ≤ 1, (12)
is positive since the ﬁrst two terms of (12) are positive, third term
of (12) is nonnegative, and v can be chosen arbitrarily small. Hence,
there exists some s12 that makes p2 > p. In fact, s
1
2 = 0 can do it
since s12 = 0 satisﬁes inequality (11).
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Consider Step 2. In period 2, we have p2 such that p < p2 < pA.
To make the price in the next period p3 equal to pA, for any s21, ﬁrm
2 should be able to choose s22 such that
sˆ22 = D
�
p2

− s21 −
pA − p2
λ
.
We conﬁrm sˆ22 is feasible. See if sˆ
2
2 ≤ D
�
pA

:
D (pA)− sˆ
2
2 = D
�
pA

−D
�
p2

+ s21 +
pA − p2
λ
= −
pA − p2
b
+ s21 +
pA − p2
λ
=

b− λ
bλ
�
pA − p2

+ s21 > 0.
Then, check if sˆ22 ≥ 0:
sˆ22 = D
�
p2

−
pA − p
λ
+
p2 − p
λ
− s21
> D
�
p2

− e+
p2 − p
λ
− s21
= (1− k)D
�
p0

+
p2 − p
λ
+

pA − p2
b
− s21

where we use p1 ≤ p < pA < p0 and p0 − p1 = λe in the second line.
In the last line, we see that the ﬁrst two terms are positive. If the
last term is nonnegative, then sˆ22 ≥ 0 is satisﬁed. If the last term is
negative, i.e., p
A−p2
b < s
2
1, then, for such s
2
1, ﬁrm 2 can choose some
s22 ≤ D (pA) to clear the market.
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Thus, for every strategy ﬁrm 1 will take after ﬁrm 2’s deviation,
ﬁrm 2 can ﬁnd corresponding strategies that eventually make the
market clear, and receive a higher proﬁt than p0s0∗2 . Therefore, the
original pair
�
s0∗1 , s
0∗
2

=
�
kD
�
p0

, (1− k)D
�
p0

is not supported
in any SPNE.
5 Concluding remarks
In this note, we have examined behaviors of duopoly ﬁrms under two
diﬀerent transaction rules: supply function competition and Wal-
rasian taˆtonnement. Under supply function competition, in general
any prices, and in particular the monopoly price, can be supported as
an equilibrium outcome. To avoid such an “anything can happen” re-
sult, we imposed some restrictions on supply functions. We ﬁnd that
if supply functions are restricted to be nondecreasing, equilibrium
outcomes are at most as uncompetitive as Cournot equilibrium. On
the other hand, continuity restriction on supply functions are neither
suﬃcient nor necessary to avoid collusive equilibrium.
For Walrasian taˆtonnement, our ﬁnding thus far is that if the
initial price is above the Cournot price, that initial price is never
market clearing if we impose nondecreasingness on supply. Thus, we
have seen some similarity between supply function competition and
Walrasian taˆtonnement. However, in order to make supply function
24
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competition and Walrasian taˆtonnement fully comparable, we need
to prove three more propositions in addition to Proposition 3. That
is, we have to prove that: (1) for any p0, p > a3 is never supported as a
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome under Walrasian taˆtonnement;
(2) when p0 ≤ a3 , p
0 can be supported as a subgame perfect equi-
librium outcome under Walrasian taˆtonnement; and (3) for any p0,
p ≤ a3 can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
under Walrasian taˆtonnement.
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